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CASE NOTES
COLGROVE v. BATTIN-
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SIX-MEMBER JURIES
IN FEDERAL CIVIL ACTIONS
In Colgrove v. Battin,' the United States Supreme Court held that a
twelve-member jury is not a necessary component of the substantive
right of trial by jury, and that a six-member panel in federal civil actions
is constitutional in the context of the seventh amendment. The petitioner
brought an action for libel in the United States District Court for the
District of Montana. Pursuant to Local Rule 13(d)(1) of the Revised
Rules of Procedure for the United States District Court, 2 respondent dis-
trict court judge set this diversity case for trial before a jury consisting
of six persons. On or about October 4, 1971, petitioner sought a writ
of mandamus from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
to direct respondent to impanel a twelve-member jury. To support his
writ, petitioner contended that the local rule violated the seventh amend-
ment,3 violated the statutory provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2072 which preserves
"... ,the right to trial by jury as at common law and as declared by
the Seventh Amendment . . .,,4 and was rendered invalid by Rule 83 of
1. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
2. Rule 13(d)(1) provides: "A jury for the trial of civil cases shall consist
of six persons plus such alternate jurors as may be impaneled." This rule became
effective on September 1, 1971.
3. The seventh amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trail by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to -the rules of the common law.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules the
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and pro-
cedure of the district courts and courts of appeals of the United States in
civil actions, including admiralty and maritime cases, and appeals therein,
and the practice and procedure in proceedings for the review by the courts
of appeals of decisions of the Tax Court of the United States and for the
judicial review or enforcement of orders of administrative agencies, boards,
commissions, and officers.
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because 'it was inconsistent with
Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides for juries
of less than twelve when stipulated by the parties. 5 The Ninth Circuit
did not agree with these contentions, 6 denied the request, and upheld
the constitutional validity of the district court rule. The Supreme Court
of the United States granted the petitioner's request for a writ of certior-
ari, and subsequently, the Court, finding no merit in the -petitioner's con-
tentions, affirmed the constitutional validity of the district court rule.
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
In reaching the decision that the six-member panel was constitutional
in terms of the seventh amendment, 7 the analysis of the majority in Col-
grove was based on a three step approach: first, a consideration of the
adoption of the seventh amendment to determine whether the framers
of the Constitution had intended to include the twelve-man panel in the
jury requirement; second, whether the common law right of trial by jury
mandated a jury composed of twelve members; and third, an analysis
of whether a six-member-jury satisfies the seventh amendment guarantee
of trial by jury.
GETTING AROUND THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
Considering the adoption of the seventh amendment, the Court com-
mented that, on its face, the language of the amendment concerned the
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and
shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared
by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.
5. Rule 48, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: "The parties may stip-
ulate that the jury shall consist of any number less than twelve or that a verdict
or a finding of a stated majority of the jurors shall be taken as the verdict or finding
of the jury."
Rule 83, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from
time to time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent
with these rules. . . . In all cases not provided for by rule, the district
courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these
rules.
6. 456 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1972).
7. The rationale behind the exclusion from the casenote of the petitioner's
other two contentions is twofold. Regarding petitioner's claim that the local rule
violated the statutory provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, that rules ". . . shall preserve the
right to trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment
. "..  the Court utilizes much of its rationale concerning the seventh amendment
in resolving these contentions. Therefore, for sake of avoiding repetitions, this con-
tention was not analyzed. As far as the petitioner's contention that the local rule
was rendered invalid by Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because
it was inconsistent with Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court
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type of cases for which trial by jury was afforded, and not jury char-
acteristics such as size." Conceding that there was "almost no direct evi-
dence concerning the intention of the Framers . . ."I Justice Brennan,
who delivered the majority opinion, expounded that the controversy over
the seventh amendment was not generated by a concern "for preserva-
tion of jury characteristics at common law, but by fear that the civil jury
itself would be abolished unless protected in express words."' 10 Due to
the variance in state practices as to when a civil jury trial was allowed,
a provision guaranteeing this right was omitted from the Constitution and
encountered the same difficulty when presented as one of the Bill
of Rights." As a result, the right to a jury trial in civil actions, although
treated this contention as a procedural problem whereby it held a court rule prevails
over "stipulation by the parties." The focus of this casenote centers on the sub-
stantive aspect of the case and not the procedural problem confronted by the court.
8. The Court related that the pertinent words of the seventh amendment were:
"In suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ..
413 U.S. at 151.
9. Id. at 152; Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80
HARv. L. REv. 289, 291 (1966).
10. 413 U.S. at 152.
11. Id. at 153. 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 587
(1911). The question of a provision for the protection of the right to trial by
jury in civil cases apparently was not presented at the Constitutional Convention until
a proposed final draft of the Constitution was reported out of the Committee on Style
and Arrangement. At that point, Mr. Williamson of North Carolina "observed to
the House that no provision was yet made for juries in civil cases and suggested
the necessity of it." This provoked the following discussion:
Mr. Gorham. It is not possible to discriminate equity cases from those in
which juries are proper. The Representatives of the people may be safely
trusted in this matter.
Mr. Gerry urged the necessity of Juries to guard [against] corrupt
Judges. He proposed that the Committee last appointed should be directed
to provide a clause for securing the trial by Juries.
Col. Mason perceived the difficulty mentioned by Mr. Gorham. The
jury cases cannot be specified. A general principle laid down on this and
some other points would be sufficient. He wished the plan had prefaced
with a Bill of Rights, and would second a Motion if made for the purpose.
Three days later, a proposal was made by Mr. Gerry and Mr. Pinckney to add
the following language to the Art. III guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases:
"And a trial by jury shall be preserved as usual in civil cases." This proposal
prompted the following reaction:
Mr. Gorham. The constitution of Juries is different in different States
and the trial itself is usual in different cases in different States.
Mr. King urged the same objections.
Genl. Pinckney. He thought such a clause in the Constitution would be
pregnant with embarrassments.
The proposal was neither accepted nor rejected, but was returned to the Committee
1974] 755
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incorporated into the seventh amendment, was limited to "suits at com-
mon law.' 1 2  Therefore, the Court concluded by simply reiterating what
was stated in Williams v. Florida'5 with respect to criminal jury trials,
namely, that the framers did not intend to "equate the constitutional and
common law characteristics of the jury.'1 4
Having dispensed with the intent on the part of the framers of the
Constitution, the majority cited prior decisions which defined the seventh
amendment jury right as coextensive with the common law right of trial
by jury.' 5 Moreover, the Court refuted several earlier United States Su-
preme Court decisions which held that trial by jury meant "a trial by
a jury of twelve,"' 16 by remarking that the above statement was at best
an assumption and merely unsupported dicta of these earlier decisions. 17
Justice Brennan resolved the issue by just relying on the Court's rejection
in Williams of the notion that "the reliability of the jury as a fact finder
[is] a function of its size."' 8  Hence, the Court concluded that twelve
members is not a substantive aspect of the common-law right of trial by
jury.
Failing to find codification in the framer's intent as well as the common
law right to trial by jury, the Court concluded that the seventh amend-
ment did not mandate a jury of twelve and turned to its final considera-
tion, namely, whether a jury of six satisfies the seventh amendment guar-
antee of "trial by jury." The Court upheld the constitutionality of this
on Style to provide such a clause for consideration. Respondent's Brief for Certiorari
at 4, Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
12. 413 U.S. at 155. The seventh amendment was added to the Bill of Rights
largely due to the strong pressure brought by the Anti-Federalists who feared the
ultimate abolition of civil juries unless protected by straightforward language. Hen-
derson, supra note 9, at 292. See Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) where Mr. Justice Story stated: "One of the strong-
est objections originally taken against the constitution of the United States was the
want of an express provision securing the right of trial by jury in civil cases."
13. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). In the decision in Williams, the Court sustained the
constitutionality of a Florida statute providing for six-member juries in certain crim-
inal cases. Moreover, the Court concluded that the states are not required by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to provide for a twelve member
jury in all criminal cases.
14. Id. at 99.
15. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); See
also Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HAv. L. REv. 669,
671-72 (1918).
16. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,
174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899).
17. 413 U.S. at 157-58.
18. 399 U.S. at 100-01.
756 [Vol. 23
CASE NOTES
contention simply by relying upon the conclusion reached in Williams,
that there is "no discernible difference between the results reached by
the two different-sized juries."' 9
What is troubling about the Court's opinion is not so much its result
as its approach. For many decades, the major stumbling block which
lay before those pursuing six-member juries in civil cases was the seventh
amendment. 20 Yet, it seemed that the Supreme Court, in Colgrove, had
relatively little difficulty in overcoming this barrier merely by tacitly ac-
cepting its findings in Williams and applying them to the instant civil ac-
tion. What the Court failed to take into account was that Williams was
not dispositive of this case. In Williams, the Court upheld a conviction
obtained by the State of Florida before a jury of six persons who were
impaneled pursuant to a Florida statute providing for such juries in all
but capital cases. The Court in Williams held that the "impartial jury"
guaranteed by the sixth amendment "in all criminal prosecutions," and
the right to a jury trial in criminal cases provided by article III of the
Constitution, do not require a twelve person panel.21
Despite sweeping language in the majority opinion, this case does not
lay a foundation as to whether civil federal practice, under the seventh
amendment, would support six-member juries. In the first place, the
Court in Colgrove provided a rationale as to why Williams is not disposi-
tive of this case. Distinguishing between the purpose which a jury trial
served in criminal and civil cases respectively, the Court related that pre-
vention of government oppression was the purpose in criminal cases, 22
whereas the purpose of civil jury trials involved the assurance of a fair
and equitable resolution of factual issues. 23 Secondly, Williams was a
state criminal case under the sixth and fourteenth amendments, where-
as Colgrove involved a federal civil case under the seventh amendment.
This is pertinent since there is a critical distinction between the sixth
amendment criminal jury and the seventh amendment civil jury. The
seventh amendment provides: "In suits at common law . .. the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury ...
shall be otherwise examined in any court .. . than according to the
rules of the common law." The seventh amendment makes reference
19. Id. at 101.
20. Croake, Memorandum on the Advisability and Constitutionality of Six Man
Juries and 516 Verdicts in Civil Cases, 44 N.Y.S.B.J. 385 (October 1972).
21. 399 U.S. at 102-04.
22. 413 U.S. at 157; 399 U.S. at 100.
23. 413 U.S. at 157; Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498
(1931).
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to the common law twice and preserves the right to trial by jury. The
sixth amendment, on the other hand, only provides for an "impartial jury"
in all criminal prosecutions. There is no direct language referring to com-
mon law standards, nor a requirement that trial by jury be preserved.
As noted by the Court in Williams, these textual differences are explained
by the special history of the sixth amendment which had no effect on
the seventh amendment. 24  Since the Williams decision relied in part on
these textual differences between the amendments and specifically point-
ed out that the seventh amendment illustrates that the framers knew how
to incorporate common law features when they wanted to do so, one can
conclude that the seventh amendment, unlike the sixth, requires a com-
mon law jury.26
Finally, the Court misread the Williams case and miscalculated the ef-
fect that case had on the seventh amendment. In Williams, the majority
opinion expressly reserved the question whether its decision would also
apply under the seventh amendment. "[W]e do not decide whether ...
-additional references to the 'common law' that occur in the Seventh
Amendment might support a different interpretation." 26 Hence, combin-
ing all these rationales, the Williams case should not be taken as authori-
zation for the use of six-man juries in civil cases.
Despite the inadequate rationale presented by the Court as to why the
local rule did not violate the seventh amendment, it does not follow that
the Court's holding should have been decided otherwise. Rather, if the
24. 399 U.S. at 94-96. Certain proposed drafts of the sixth amendment differed
from the final form of the amendment in that they included proposed requirements
of "unanimity for conviction" and "other accustomed requisites." The framers could
not agree that the criminal jury should be a pure common law jury, and the Court
in Williams concluded that these requirements were deleted in the final text of the
sixth amendment as the result of a compromise. 399 U.S. at 96.
Their absence indicated to the Court that a pure common law jury was not in-
tended by the Framers regarding the sixth amendment.
[W]here Congress wanted to leave no doubt that it was incorporating ex-
isting common law features of the jury system, it knew how to use express
language to that effect .... And the Seventh Amendment, providing
for jury trial in civil cases, explicitly added "no fact tried by a jury shall
be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than accord-
ing the rules of the common law."
399 U.S. at 97.
This history makes the seventh amendment's two references to "common law"
and its requirement that the right to trial by jury be "preserved" seem especially
significant when compared with the bar requirement of an "impartial jury" in the
sixth amendment.
25. Brief for Nooter Corporation as Amicus Curiae at 12, Colgrove v. Battin,
413 U.S. 149 (1973).
26. 399 U.S. at 92, n.30.
Court would have given proper and adequate consideration to its three-
step approach when analyzing the case, there would not have been any
necessity to totally rely on the Williams case to uphold six-member juries
in civil cases.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR TWELVE-MEMBER JURIES
"While the 'intent of the Framers' is often an elusive quarry, the rele-
vant constitutional history cast considerable doubt on the easy assump-
tion . . . that if a given feature existed in a jury at common law in
1789, then it was necessarily preserved in the Constitution. '27  In the
proceeding at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, the issue of
trial by jury in civil cases was raised in debate, but intentionally left out
of the final document. Yet, the reason presented in Colgrove, for this
omission,28 in and of itself, is not dispositive of the issue. A provision
for trial by jury was omitted from the original seven articles of the Consti-
tution because: the convention members desired to go home;29 fear
among convention leaders that prolonged and protracted dispute and de-
bate over the issue might very well devastate the agreement that had
already been arrived at; the delegates had fulfilled the burning necessi-
ty for preserving the right of jury trial in all criminal cases; and the dele-
gates felt Congress would promulgate the right to jury trial by legisla-
tion.30  Moreover, the Court did not adequately analyze the framers' in-
tent in terms of the twice-mentioned term "common law" contained in
the amendment itself.31
Historical evidence bears out the fact that the words "common law"
as used in the seventh amendment refer to the right of jury trial as guar-
anteed by the common law of England, and action to be tried by a jury-
suits at law-as opposed to those tried without a jury-suits in admiralty
27. Id. at 92.
28. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
29. Henderson, supra note 9, at 294-96.
30. Respondent's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 11, at 4-5.
31. Although the Court relates that the pertinent words of the seventh amend-
ment are: "In suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved
... " it does not go any further in analyzing what the Framers meant by the first
reference to the "common law" other than to say it defines the kind of case for
which jury trial is preserved. 413 U.S. at 152.
As far as the second reference to "common law," the Court felt it was irrelevant
to the present inquiry because it dealt with the prohibition contained in that clause
against the indirect impairment of the right of trial by jury through judicial reex-
amination of fact-findings of a jury other than as permited in 1791. 413 U.S. at
152, n.6.
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and equity.8 2  With regard to the first reference to the term "common
law," history supports the contention that it was used to distinguish the
right of jury trial as it existed in common law actions as opposed to the
procedures pertaining to equity and admiralty cases where no right to
jury trial existed. This was clearly brought out in Federalist No. 8333
as well as in the background of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which was
debated at the same time as the amendment.8 4
Due to the extreme variance in jury utilization throughout the states,
Alexander Hamilton was adamantly opposed to a constitutional provision
for trial by jury in civil cases.8 5  Yet, he did relate the necessity of
distinguishing suits at law from those in admiralty and equity in deter-
mining which cases should be tried by a jury.86  Using his home state
of New York as a focal point in analyzing the omission of a specific
civil jury process, 7 Hamilton discussed the separation of law and equity
jurisdiction. 8 He concluded that uniform rules for civil juries would be
impossible.8 9
32. Fisher, The Seventh Amendment and the Common Law: No Magic in Num-
bers, 56 F.R.D. 507, 511 (1972).
33. THKE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 424 (M. Beloff ed. 1948) (A. Hamilton).
34. Fisher, supra note 32, at 522.
35. Id.
36. Supra note 33, at 426. Hamilton stated:
Add to this, that admiralty causes, and almost all those which are of
equity jurisdiction, are determinable under our own government without the
intervention of a jury, and the inference from the whole will be that this
institution as it exits with us at present, cannot possibly be affected to any
great extent, by the proposed alteration in our system of government.
37. Id. at 429-30.
38. It is true that the separation of the equity from the legal jurisdiction is
peculiar to the English system of jurisprudence, which is the model that
has been followed in several of the States; but it is equally true that the
trial by jury has been unknown in every case in which they have been
united. And the separation is essential to the preservation of that institu-
tion in its pristine purity. The nature of a court of equity will readily per-
mit the extension of its jurisdiction to matters of law; but it is not a little
to be suspected that the attempt to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of
law to matters of equity will not only be unproductive of the advantages
which may be derived from courts of chancery, on the plan upon which
they are established in this State, but will tend gradually to change the na-
ture of the courts of law, and to undermine the trial by jury by introduc-
ing questions too complicated for a decision in that mode.
These appear to be conclusive reasons against incorporating the systems
of all the States in the formation of the national judiciary.
Id. at 432.
39. To devise a plan of that kind is a task arduous in itself, and which it
would require much time and reflection to mature. It would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to suggest any general regulation that would be
acceptable to all the States in the Union, or that would perfectly quadrate
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Justice Story, in his discussion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the
seventh amendment, declared that the term "common law" was used to
distinuish cases at law from cases in equity and admiralty. 40 Moreover,
the same position has been adopted by the lower federal courts as well
as the United States Supreme Court.41
The second use of the term "common law" is contained in the phrase
"than according to the rules of common law."'42  This phrase is designed
to qualify the words "and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-
examined in any court of the United States."'43 The use of "common law"
in this instance specifically refers to the reexamination of facts tried by
with the several State institutions.
Id. at 433-34.
40. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrruTION OF THE UNITED STATES
645-46 (L. Levy ed. 1970). Story states:
At this time there were no states in the Union, the basis of whose juris-
prudence was not essentially that of the common law in its widest mean-
ing; and probably no states were contemplated, in which it would not ex-
ist. The phrase, "common law" found in this clause, is used in contradis-
tinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence. The con-
stitution had declared, in the third article, "that the judicial power shall ex-
tend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws
of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under
their authority," &c., and "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion." It is well known, that in civil causes, in courts of equity and ad-
miralty, juries do not intervene; and that courts of equity use the trial by
jury only in extraordinary cases to inform the conscience of the court.
When, therefore, we find that the amendment requires that the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved in suits at common law, the natural con-
clusion is that the distinction was present to the minds of the Framers of
the amendment. By common law they meant, what the Constitution de-
nominated in the third article 'law;' not merely suits, which the common
law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits, in which
legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction
to those, in which equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable
remedies were administered; or in which, as in the admiralty, a mixture
of public law, and of maritime law and equity, was often found in the
same suit.
41. This position was adopted by the federal district court in Ross-Meehan Bride
Shoe Foundry Co. v. Southern Malleable Iron Co., 72 F. 957, 960 (C.C.E.D. Tenn.
1896).
In Parson v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830), the Court stated:
The phrase 'common law' found in this [first] clause is used in contra-
distinction to equity, and admiralty and maritime jurisprudence * * * It
is well known that in civil causes in courts of equity and admiralty, juries
do not intervene, and that courts of equity use the trial by jury only in ex-
traordinary cases * * * When, therefore, we find, that the amendment
requires that the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, in suits at com-
mon law, the natural conclusion is that this distinction was present to the
minds of the framers of the amendment.
See Ross v. Bernhard, 397 U.S. 531 (1970).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
43. Id.
1974]
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a jury and does not refer to a certain number of people that must com-
prise the jury.4 4  The United States Supreme Court has interpreted
this reference to "common law" as assuring no judge or judges shall sub-
stitute their decision on fact issues in the place and stead of the fact
findings of a jury. 45  Thus, a close examination of the construction of
the twice-mentioned term "common law" in the seventh amendment re-
veals the framers' intentions were to express two independent thoughts:
"(1) the distinction between law and equity and (2) the limitation on
reexamination of facts, rather than engraft a specific number of jurors
on jury procedure." 46
It is also interesting to note that the Court did not rely on Williams
when it should have. The Court in Williams recognized that the framers
did not intend to exalt form over substance when they considered three
factors in arriving at the conclusion that the sixth amendment did not
mandate a jury of twelve. First, the vicinage requirement, which was
as much as feature of the common law jury as was the twelve-man re-
quirement, 47 was specifically left out by the framers. 48  Secondly, all pro-
visions explicitly tying the jury concept to the "accustomed requisites"
of the time were eliminated.49 Finally, "contemporary legislative and
constitutional provisions indicated that where Congress wanted to leave
no doubt that it was incorporating existing common law features of the
jury system, it knew how to use express language to that effect."50  From
its observations, the Court concluded that while the framers may have
had the twelve-man jury in mind when they adopted the Constitution,
nothing in history suggests that the twelve-man requirement was an "in-
dispensible component of the Sixth Amendment."'51
Ever since the earliest proposals to form a union, the premise that
Americans are entitled to the right of trial by jury according to the course
of English common law has been emphatically stated. 2  Although the
44. Fisher, supra note 32, at 511.
45. Baltimore & Carolina Line Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
46. Fisher, supra note 32, at 511.
47. 1 G. CuRTIs, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 23 (1863).
Technically, "vicinage" means neighborhood, and "vicinage of the jury" meant
jury of the neighborhood or, in medieval England, jury of the county. See 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 350-51 (1849).
48. 399 U.S. 78, 96 (1970).
49. Id.
50. ld.
51. Id.
52. H.S. COMMANGER, DOCuMENTS OF AMrmucAN HISTORY 44, 83, 93, 101 (5th
ed. 1949).
[Vol. 23
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seventh amendment appears clearly to preserve the common law jury in
all cases where such a jury trial was permitted in 1791, in no part of
the Constitution, the United States Code, or the civil rules does the num-
ber twelve appear as descriptive of the size of a civil jury.53 Yet, as
mentioned by the Court in Colgrove, prior constitutional interpretation
of the seventh amendment has recognized that trial by jury in a civil
action required twelve individuals. 54  Therefore, an analysis of the his-
torical derivation of the jury and the twelve-member panel as well as
significant cases which have construed the seventh amendment itself is
necessary to provide a more concrete rationale as to why a jury of twelve
is not a substantive component of the common law right of trial by jury.
The Court, in Colgrove, did not take into consideration the origin
of the jury and the number "12" in determining whether a twelve-mem-
ber jury is part and parcel of the common law right of trial by jury.
Historians and students of the law have probed deeply into the shadowy
past to establish the historical genesis and gradual development of the
institution of trial by jury. 55 Still, no matter how exhuastive these stud-
ies are in delving into the subject, "the origins of the system and the
steps by which it evolved are shrouded in doubt, with only the end result
established.56
The earliest tribunals which resembled our modem trial by jury
appeared among the ancient Greeks, Romans, and Scandinavians. 57  Yet,
53. Bogue and Fritz, The Six-Man Jury, 17 S. DAK. L. REV. 285, 286 (1972);
Devitt, Six-Member Civil Juries Gain Backing, 57 A.B.A.J. 1111 (1971); Tamm, A
Proposal for Five-Member Civil Juries in the Federal Courts, 50 A.B.A.J. 162
(1964); Tamm, The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment,
51 Gao. L.J. 120, 128 (1962).
Constitutional history does not reveal an occasion where twelve was desired to
be preserved as a traditional number. On the contrary James Wilson of Pennsyl-
vania, a member of the Constitutional Congress, stated: "When I speak of juries,
I feel no peculiar predilection for the number twelve ...... II J. ANDREWS, THE
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 503 (McCloskey ed. 1967).
But see Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Also 12-member juries
are required, specifically, in criminal cases by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
54. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899). See also Maxwell
v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900); American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S.
464, 468 (1897).
55. Tamm, supra note 53, at 162.
56. Id. at 163. It is also important to note that various writers have reached
conclusions concerning the origin of the jury diametrically opposed to the findings
and conclusions made in other studies. Hogan, Joseph Story on Juries, 37 ORE.
L. REv. 234 (1958); Stephens, The Growth of Trial by Jury in England, 10 HAv.
L. REv. 150 (1896); Thayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5 HIv. L. REV. 249,
295, 357 (1892).
57. Augelli, Six-Member Juries in Civil Actions in the Federal Judicial System,
3 SETON HALL L. REV. 281, 282 (1972). In ancient Greece, there was the
1974]
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it is now generally acknowledged that the origin of the jury is to be found
in royal privilege. 58 When the Normans invaded England in 1066, the
jury originated as a result of the Frankish "inquisition." 59  In the twelfth
century, under Henry II, the royal procedure of the inquest was made
available to the people, the purpose being the creation of a monopoly
in the Crown for the administration of justice. Questions of fact were
submitted to a jury who had knowledge of these facts in dispute, and
it was the jury's responsibility to resolve these questions of fact. More-
over, the impetus for trial by jury was further strengthened by the pro-
hibition of Pope Innocent III in 1215, which provided that the clergy
could not participate in trials by ordeal. 0 As a result of these reforms
ranging from the ordinances of Henry II to the resulting developments
under them, by the thirteenth century, the modern institution of trial by
jury evolved"' and became the typical procedure utilized in civil and
criminal cases.
History affords little insight into the considerations that gradually led
to the size of the jury to be generally fixed at twelve.!2  It has been
suggested that the number twelve was fixed simply because that was the
number of the presentment jury from which the petit jury developed. 63
Other fanciful reasons for the number twelve have been given, "but they
dikast, which was composed of 500 citizens chosen by lot; in ancient Rome, the
comitia, a representative body which examined disputed facts; and in ancient Scan-
dinavia, small district committees administerd by the law. Id.
These tribunals were similar to our modem jury in that the citizens were selected
from general lists of men in the city or district, judicial power was transferred from
the state to laymen, and the citizens that participated were sworn in to give a valid
verdict. Id. at 282-83. But see F. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS 5
(1959).
58. F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTrrUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 6 (1951); E. JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 47 (2d rev. ed.
1920).
59. 1 F. POLLACK & F. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 140 (2d
ed. 1898). The "inquistio" was an institution compelling the oldest and wisest men
in each district to answer, upon their oath, questions presented by royal officials
in the name of the King.
However, in those early times, the inquisition had no fixed number. For in-
stance, in the Frankish Empire, it was composed of "66, 41, 20, 17, 13, 11, 8, 7,
53, 15, and a great variety of other numbers." Thayer, supra note 56, at 295.
60. Augelli, supra note 57, at 283.
61. Busch, supra note 57, at 9.
62. 399 U.S. at 89.
63. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 325 (1927); Wells, The Ori-
gin of the Petty Jury, 27 L.Q. REv. 347, 357 (1911). It is important to note that
neither of these authors hazards a guess as to why the presentment jury itself num-
bered twelve.
[Vol. 23
CASE NOTES
were all brought forward after the number was fixed," 64 and rest on little
more than mystical or superstitious insight into the significance of
"twelve." 65  For example, it has been posited that twelve was devised
because court astrologers, who were in charge of choosing juries, selected
one name for each of the signs of the Zodiac.6 6 Romantic explanations
have been offered for the number twelve, including Lord Coke's explana-
tion "that the number of twelve is much respected in the Holy Writ, as
twelve Apostles, twelve stones, twelve tribes, etc."'67
Yet, no matter what reason behind this number, under Henry
H, twelve was established as the usual number.68  Still, it is important
64. Wells, supra note 63, at 357.
65. 399 U.S. at 89.
66. Wiehl, The Six Man fury, 4 GONZAGA L. REV. 35 (1968). The rationale
for the cited premise was that it would assure a fair verdict in that it would bring
every type of mind and temperament to consider the question.
67. 1 COKE, INsTrrUTEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 155 (1797). The same
thought was advanced at greater length in DUNCOMBE'S TRiALS PER PAIS where
he stated:
And first of their Number Twelve: And this Number is no less es-
teemed of by our Law than by Holy Writ. If the twelve Apostles on their
twelve thrones, must try us in our eternal State, good Reason hath the Law
to appoint the Number of Twelve to try our Temporal. The Tribes of Is-
rael were Twelve, the Patriarchs were Twelve, and Solomon's Officers were
Twelve. . . . Therefore not only Matters of Fact were tried by Twelve,
but of ancient Times, twelve Judges were to try Matters in Law, in the Ex-
chequer-Chamber, and there were twelve Counsellors of State for Matters
of State; and he that wageth his Law must have eleven others with him
who believe he says true. And the Law is so precise in this Number of
Twelve, that if the Trial be by more or less, it is a Mistrial ...
1 TRALs PER PAIS 92-93 (8th ed. 1766).
Sir Patrick Devlin also propounded the same thought when he stated:
Many romantic explanations have been offered of the number twelve-
the Twelve Tribes of Israel, the Twelve Patriarchs, and the Twelve offi-
cers of Solomon recorded in the Book of Kings, and the Twelve Apostles.
Not all of these suggestions are equally happy; the first implies that there
may be a thirteenth juror who got lost somewhere in the corridor, and the
last that there is a Judas on every jury. It is clear that what was wanted
was a number that was large enough to create a formidable body of opin-
ion in favor of the side that won; and doubtless the reason for having
twelve instead of ten, eleven or thirteen was much the same as gives twelve
pennies to the shilling and which exhibits an early English abhorrence of
the decimal system.
DEVLiN, TaiAL By JuRY 8 (1956).
68. Thayer, supra note 56, at 295.
Similarly, Professor Scott writes:
At the beginning of the thirteenth century twelve was indeed the usual
but not the invariable number. But by the middle of the fourteenth cen-
tury the requirement of twelve had probably become definitely fixed. In-
deed this number finally came to be regarded with something like supersti-
tious reverence.
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to note that prior to and subsequent to that time, the number was not
uniform. 69 Moreover, juries consisting of less than twelve members were
quite common to colonial America. 70 The Duke of York's Law, in force
in several colonies late in the seventeenth century stated:
No jury shall exceed the number of Seven nor be under Six unless in
special causes upon Life and Death, the Justices shall think fitt to appoint
Twelve.7 1
Citizens of North Carolina petitioned for juries of six men in 1769.72
The Colony of Maryland used a jury of ten in a case during the March
term of the Provisional Court in 1681-1682, 73 and a jury of eleven in
November of that year.7 4  Thus, when analyzing the reasons offered as
to why twelve members would comprise a jury as well as the various
fluctuations that existed due to "convenience or local custom,"7 5  it is
apparent that the number twelve was a historical accident, unrelated to
the great purposes which gave rise to the jury in the first place."' 76
A. SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS AT LAW 75-76 (1922).
Forsyth has mentioned: "Although twelve was the most usual, it was not the
the unvarying number of the jurors of the assise for some years." W. FORSYTH, HIS-
TORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 131 (1852).
69. 1 J.H. WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEM 299 (1928).
The Ancient Greeks utilized juries of 500, 1000, and 1500 members. Id.
"[A]mong the Normans it varied much, and 'twelve has not even the place of
the prevailing grundzahl; the documents show all sorts of numbers-4, 5, 6, 12, 13-
18, 21, 27, 30, and so on." Thayer, supra note 56, at 295. Jocelin's Chronicle
mentions juries of six and sixteen. See Forsyth, supra note 68, at 131-33.
70. Contra, Augelli, supra note 57, at 284.
71. Fisher, supra note 32, at 529, citing 1 COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK,
40 (1894).
72. H.S. Commager, supra note 52, at 69. The petition of the Regulators of
Anson County dated October 9, 1769 included a provision providing:
That all debts above 40s, and under £10 be tried and determined with-
out lawyers, by a jury of six freeholders impanled by a justice, and that
their verdict be enter'd by the said justice and be a final judgment.
73. Fisher, supra note 32, at 530, citing 70 PRINTED ARCHIVES OF MARY-
LAND 160 (1964).
74. Id.
75. Wiehl, supra note 66, at 39.
76. 399 U.S. at 89-90. It is interesting to note that even Justice Harlan, in
his dissent, was unable to present any authority substantiating some other reason,
apart from chance, for the selection of twelve as the appropriate number. Id. at
117 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The following also advocate the holding made in Williams: P. DEVLIN, TRIAL
JURY 8 (1956); F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 64 (1951); Tamm, The
Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 51 GEO. L.J. 120, 128-
130 (1962); Wiehl, The Six Man Jury, 4 GONZAGA L. REV. 35, 38-39 (1968).
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NO MANDATE FOR TWELVE-MEMBER JURIES
Although prior decisions of the Supreme Court held that "trial by jury"
meant "a trial by a jury of twelve,"'7 7 the Court, in Colgrove, refuted
these holdings by remarking that, "in each case, the reference to a 'jury
of twelve' was clearly dictum and not a decision upon a question present-
ed or litigated."781 Thus, in Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,79 the case most
often cited, the Court's finding was correct. As related in the majority
opinion in Colgrove, the question presented in Hof concerned whether
a civil action brought before a justice of the peace of the District of Co-
lumbia was triable by a jury. There, the result rested on whether the
justice of the peace was a judge empowered to instruct them on the
law and advise them on the facts.80 Moreover, one commentator has
suggested that the effect of adopting the Hof view would make "a fetish of
a historical accident, would impose a nearly patternless pattern of practice
on the courts, and would cut off arbitrarily a normal, rational de-
velopment." 81
Yet, considering another case cited by the court, namely Maxwell v.
Dow,8 2 which upheld the view expounded in Hof, the Court's rationale
in Colgrove is immaterial. Maxwell was a criminal case, unlike the
civil action in Colgrove, in which the plaintiff in error contended that
a trial by jury of only eight persons abridged his privileges and immuni-
ties as a citizen of the United States, as secured by the sixth83 and
fourteenth8 4 amendments.85 Therefore, the Court should have placed
77. Supra note 16.
78. 413 U.S. at 157.
79. 174 U.S. at 1.
80. Id. at 13-14.
81. Henderson, supra note 9, at 336.
82. 176 U.S. at 581.
83. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trail, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the ac-
cusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assist-
ance of Counsel for his defence.
84. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
85. 176 U.S. at 582.
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Maxwell in its proper perspective, and refuted the contention in Maxwell
when confronting the problem in Williams, rather than inappropriately
incorporating it in Colgrove.
Even if the above contention had support in common law doctrine,
other significant cases which have construed the seventh amendment have
shown that the common law is flexible and adapts itself by its own prin-
ciples to varying conditions.86 In Ex parte Peterson,8 7 Justice Brandeis
commented with respect to the seventh amendment:
The command of the Seventh Amendment that the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved, does not require that forms of practice and procedure
be retained .... New devices may be used to adapt the ancient institu-
tion [jury trial] to present needs and to make of it an efficient instrument
in the administration of justice. Indeed such changes are essential to the
preservation of the right. The limitation imposed by the amendment is
merely that enjoyment of the right of trial by jury be not obstructed, and
that ultimate determination of issues of fact by the jury be not interfered
with.88
The Supreme Court, in Galloway v. United States,89 commented on the
Ninth Circuit Court's affirmation of a motion for a directed verdict in
the context of the seventh amendment:
The [Seventh] Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact
procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the common law
in 1791, any more than it tied them to the common-law system of plead-
ing or the specific rules of evidence then prevailing. Nor were "the rules
of the common law" then prevalent, including those relating to the pro-
cedure by which the judge regulated the jury's role on questions of fact,
crystallized in a fixed and immutable system. On the contrary, they were
constantly changing and developing during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. In 1791 this process already had resulted in widely
divergent common-law rules on procedural matters among the states, and
between them and England. 90
Hence, in the context of the framers' intentions as well as the common
law right to trial by jury, the seventh amendment does not mandate a
jury of twelve.
EFFICACY OF SIX-MEMBER JURIES
The major criticism of the jury system as presently constituted directly
pertain to the incompetence of jurors and the inefficiency inherent in the
86. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293
U.S. 474, 487 (1935).
87. 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
88. Id. at 309-10.
89. 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
90. Id. at 390-92.
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process. 1 Critics contend that a jury lacks expertise in interpretation
of the law and is therefore more likely to become confused than would
a skilled jurist trying the same case.92 Yet, despite these problems, the
majority of the critics believe the jury system is too valuable to abolish
entirely.93  In an attempt to preserve the beneficial aspects of the jury
system as well as to minimize the excessive investment of time and money
which it requires many jurists have proposed, 94 many states have legis-
lated, 95 and at least fifty-seven federal district courts have adopted
local rules96 providing for a reduction in the size of the jury. With this
in mind, an analysis of the court's last step, namely, whether a jury of
six satisfies the seventh amendment guarantee of "trial by jury," is neces-
sary.
When confronted with this aspect of its rationale, the Court, in Colgrove,
merely upheld the conclusion made in Williams that there was no dis-
cernible difference between the results reached between a twelve-mem-
ber and a six-member jury.9 7 Yet, in Williams, the Supreme Court sup-
ported its conclusion by relying on six articles in legal periodicals. 8 Some-
91. See, e.g., Lousberg, On Keeping the Civil Jury Trial, 43, NOTRE DAME LAW.
344 (1968); Comment, The Case for Retention of the Unanimous Civil Jury, 15 DE-
PAUL L. REV. 403, 407 (1966).
92. Lousberg, supra note 91, at 345; Comment, Abolition of the Civil Jury:
Proposed Alternatives, 15 Dn PAUL L. REv. 416, 419,-21 (1966).
93. Summers, Some Merits of Civil Jury Trials, 39 TuL. L. REV. 3, 8-9 (1964).
94. Bogue & Fritz, supra note 53; Phillips, A Jury of Six in All Cases, 30 CONN.
B.J. 354 (1956); Tamm, supra note 53; Wiehl, supra note 66.
95. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1352 (Supp. 1973). "In a civil
case. . . trial shall be by jury of 6. ..... " CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-7-4 (1963);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-243 (1960); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.44.120
(1956).
Two bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives in the 92nd Con-
gress, both of which seek to change the federal jury to six jurors. H.R. 7800, intro-
duced by William L. Scott of Virginia, would apply to juries in all civil cases impan-
eled after its enactment. H.R. 13,496, introduced by Emanuel Celler of N.Y., covers
all civil cases and noncapital criminal cases. Gibbons, The New Minijuries: Pana-
cea or Pandora's Box?, 58 A.B.A.J. 594, 599 (1972).
96. As of January 15, 1973, fifty-seven federal district courts had reduced the
size of the jury from twelve to six in some or in all civil cases, and one other
had reduced the jury to eight members in certain cases. Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, List of U.S. District Courts That Have Adopted Rules
Reducing the Size of Civil Juries. See also Fisher, supra note 32, at 535-42 (repro-
duces an Administrative Office list of 54 courts and quoting the applicable court
rules, including date of adoption).
97. 399 U.S. at 101.
98. Id. at 101 n.48. The six articles relied upon were: Cronin, Six-Member Jur-
ies in District Courts, 2 BOSTON B.J. 27 (1958); New Jersey Experiments with Six-
Man Jury, 9 BULL. OF THE SECTION OF JUDICIAL AD. OF THE ABA, May, 1966 at 6;
Phillips, A Jury of Six in All Cases, 30 CONN. B.J. 354 (1956); Tamm, The Five-
1974] CASE NOTES 769
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
of the reasons, advanced in these and other articles, why a jury composed
of six members would be better than twelve include: the time necessary
to try each civil jury case will be reduced;99 it would lighten the burden
on the community in providing jurors and give them a more favorable
impression of the judicial procedure; 100 a reduction to six would result
in a substantial financial saving;' 0 ' and a jury of six would be large
enough to provide a cross-section of the community. 102  Yet, this evi-
dence should be interpreted with some skepticism since none was based
on empirical investigation.10 3  Rather, the sources cited by the Court con-
sisted merely of the opinions of a judge,' 0 4 lawyers, 10  and clerks of the
courts.' 06
Although many articles have appeared since Williams in legal period-
icals implying that a reduction in jury size will decrease the time and
cost of jury trials, 107 several commentators have attacked that Court's con-
clusion and contend that specific differences in trial results would arise.' 08
Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 51 GEO. L.J. 120, 128
(1962); Wiehl, supra note 66 at 40-41; Six-Member Juries Tried in Massachusetts
District Court, 42 J. AM. Juo. Soc'y 136 (1958).
99. Tamm, A Proposal for Five-Member Civil Juries in the Federal Courts, 50
A.B.A.J. 162, 164 (1964). Although Judge Tamm advocates a jury of five instead
of six, he relates, concerning the reduced time in the actual trial of a case, that
the jury panel dispatched to a courtroom for the trial will be reduced by more than
50 percent. The voir dire examination will be reduced as well as the roll call of
the jury panel Jury selection will also require less time.
100. Phillips, supra note 98, at 356.
101. Bogue & Fritz, supra note 53, at 288. According to Bogue and Fritz, in
federal district court, jurors receive statutory compensation of $20.00 per day, plus
an additional $16.00 if they remain overnight. In civil cases, jurors also receive
a mileage fee of ten cents.
102. Wiehl, supra note 66, at 40.
103. Zeisel, . . . And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal
Jury, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 710, 713-15 (1971).
104. Tamm, supra note 53, at 134-36.
105. Cronin, supra note 98, at 28-29; Six-Member Juries Tried in Massachusetts
District Court, supra note 98, at 136.
106. Cronin, supra note 98, at 27.
107. Croake, supra note 20; Bogue & Fritz, supra note 53; Augelli, supra note
57; Comment, Reducing the Size of Juries, 5 U. MICH J.L. REFORM 87 (1971).
108. Pabst, What do Six-Member Juries Really Save?, 57 JUDICATURE 6 (June-
July 1973); 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 529 (1971).
The latter article incorporated a standard binomial sampling theory to compare
the expected performance of six-member and twelve-member juries in civil cases.
The author concluded that the six-member jury's probability of conviction of defend-
ants is higher in "weak" cases and lower in "strong" cases. Id. at 545-47. Zeisel
relates that smaller juries may tend to have fewer minority group members and
greater variation in verdicts. Zeisel, supra note 102 at 713-15.
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For instance, Hans Zeisel, a leading authority on American juries, 109 sim-
ulated a random sampling from a stratified society in reaching his con-
clusion that the six-member jury's damage awards have a wider varia-
tion than the twelve-member jury's award. 110 Yet, these predictions of
variation in trial results are of limited utility since they are based on
highly problematic assumptions concerning the composition and delibera-
tion of juries, and there have not been any empirical studies actually ver-
ifying the verdict-production process."' Therefore, in order to test the
validity of the Court's conclusion in Williams and affirmation in Colgrove,
empirical data is essential.
There have been few quantitative comparisons of the performances of
six-member and twelve-member juries in comparable cases. Yet, statis-
tical evidence that is available is confined to state courts who have adopted
a rule similar to the Federal District Courts' rule providing for six-
member juries. The first study concentrated on Workman's Compen-
sation Act cases heard in the superior courts of the state of Washington
during the calendar year of 1970.112 Of the 128 jury trials in civil cases
conducted in that state, ninety-five used twelve-member juries and thirty-
three used six-member juries.1 3 The number of cases in which the plain-
tiff prevailed was separated for each class of jury size from the number
of cases in which the Department of Labor and Industries (DLI) pre-
vailed. 1 4  The results showed that the distribution of decisions for the
109. See H. KALVEN JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). This
book comprises one of the most extensive studies of the American jury.
110. Zeisel, supra note 103, at 716-19. Zeisel also predicts that fewer hung
juries may be expected in six-member juries than in twelve-member juries where ver-
dicts must be unanimous.
111. Comment, Six-Member and Twelve-Member Juries: An Empirical Study of
Trial Results, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 671, 674 (1973).
112. Bermant and Coppock, Outcomes of Six- and Twelve-Member Jury Trials:
An Analysis of 128 Civil Cases in the State of Washington, 48 WASH. L. REv. 593,
594 (1973). The authors relate that Workman's Compensation cases arrive in su-
perior court only after a series of administrative lawyers are unable to reach an
agreement between the injured worker and the state's Department of Labor and In-
dustries (DLI).
The rules of the superior court provide for either a bench trial or a jury trial
in which jury size may be less than twelve if both attorneys agree.
WASH. SUPER. Or. (Civ.) R. 38 provides that unless a demand is made for a
twelve-member jury, the case "shall be tried by a jury of six members with the
concurrence of five being required to reach a verdict." It is important to note that
the federal district court in Washington requires six-member juries in all civil
cases. FED. DIST. CT. (W. WASH.) R. 39.
113. Bermant and Coppock, supra note 112, at 594.
114. Id. at 595. A four cell table, using the Chi-Square Test for independent
samples, was utilized. The results were:
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plaintiff and the DLI were virtually identical in juries of six and twelve
members.115
A study by the Institute of Judicial Administration (IJA study) was
made comparing six-member and twelve-member juries in over 650 civil
cases in New Jersey. 1 6 As far as verdicts were concerned, the study
disclosed less than a two percentage point difference between the respec-
tive percentages of verdicts rendered for the plaintiff by the two different
sized juries.117 However, the deliberation time as well as damage awards
of the respective juries did differ. 118 Yet, the reliability of these findings
is suspect since the attorneys in each case were permitted to select the
size of the jury impaneled. This resulted in twelve-member juries being
selected where the issues were complex or the potential damages large. 119
PREVAILING PARTY
JURY SIZE DLI PLAINTIFF TOTAL
six 15 18 33
twelve 44 51 95
total 59 69 128
115. Id. at 595-96. Of the total sample, 46 percent were decided for DLI and
54 percent for the plaintiff. The proportion was also reflected in both the six-
member and twelve-member juries: 45 percent and 46 percent, respectively, found
for DLI. The Chi-Square score was 0.014, a value far below that which would be
required to reject the hypothesis of no difference between six-member and twelve-
member juries.
Yet, even with these findings, the authors cautioned interpreters of these results
that the similarity of performance by these juries does not imply that the identical
social and psychological processes were operating in both cases.
116. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, A COMPARISON OF SIX-AND
TWELVE-MEMBER CIVIL JURIES IN NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR AND COUNTY COURTS 1-58
(1972) [hereinafter cited as IJA study].
117. Id. at 22.
118. Id. at 28-29. The study related the average time for six-member delibera-
tion was 1.2 hours; for twelve-member deliberation, it was 1.8 hours. Id. at 24.
Damage awards by the twelve-member juries averaged almost three times larger
than those by six.
119. Some of the results of this study included:
1. "Six-member voir dires averaged approximately 45%, or 21 minutes,
shorter than twelve-member." Id. at 7.
2. "Deliberation time by six-member juries averaged 36 minutes, or 33%,
less than time for twelve-member deliberations." Id. at 7.
3. "Cases tried before twelve-member juries took approximately twice as
much trial time as those tried before six (11 hours' trial time compared to
5.6)." id. at 7.
4. "[S]ettlements of cases started before twelve-member juries also aver-
age three times larger than settlements of cases started before six." Id. at
7.
The author of the study related that these results cannot be taken as indicating
any inherent difference between the different-sized juries:
Many of the differences between trials before six-and twelve-member juries
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The most comprehensive study comparing six-member and twelve-
member juries arose in Michigan in which the two types of jury were
'empirically tested at two levels: an analysis of the literal finding that
there are no significant differences in results, 120 and an examination of
whether the process by which those results are achieved differs between
the different-sized panels. 121
As far as trial results are concerned, data was collected from the court
records of the Circuit Court of Wayne County, Michigan 22 comprising
193 twelve-member civil jury trials (except divorces) during the six-
month period from March 1, 1969 to August 31, 1969 and 292 six-mem-
ber civil trials (except divorces) during the six-month period from March
1, 1971 to August 31, 1971.123 Both the six-member and twelve-mem-
ber jury samples were comprised of 58 per cent automobile negligence
cases and 42 per cent other general civil cases.' 24  After presenting the
data in areas which included the manner of trial termination after the
jury was impaneled, 125 trial duration,' 26 prevailing party, 12 7 the amount
appear to be due to differences in the types of cases selected by lawyers
to be tried to six-and twelve-member juries rather than to differences in
the size of the jury.
Id. at 5. But see Pabst, supra note 108, at 10-11.
120. Comment, Six-Member and Twelve-Member Juries: An Empirical Study of
Trial Results, supra note 111.
121. Comment, An Emprical Study of Six-and Twelve-Member Jury Decision-
Making Processes, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 712 (1973).
122. Wayne County, Michigan is the county comprised largely of the city of De-
troit.
123. Comment, Six-Member and Twelve-Member Juries: An Empirical Study of
Trial Results, supra note 111, at 676.
The information extracted from the history of each case included:
1. mhe dates of all important events during the progress of the case;
2. the type of case-either automobile negligence or "other general civil,"
as categorized on filing;
3. the amount of damages sought by the plaintiff, as stated in the com-
plaint;
4. the duration of the trial, in days;
5. the manner of trial termination-verdict, settlement, directed verdict,
mistrial, or hung jury-after the jury was impaneled;
6. the prevailing party in which a verdict was rendered; and
7. the amount of damages awarded in cases in which the plaintiff was the
prevailing party.
Id. at 677. Eminent domain and paternity suits were deleted from the "other gen-
eral civil" category for both six-member and twelve-member juries because the
amount sought and amount awarded data were generally unavailable from the court
records. Id. at 676-77, nn. 25, 26.
124. Id. at 677-78.
125. id. at 682-83. There were fewer settlements in the six-member jury cases
than in twelve-member jury cases.
126. Id. at 683-85. Based on the data, there was a small difference between
trial duration in the different-sized juries.
127. Id. at 684-88. Here, the author defined a plaintiff's verdict as a verdict
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sought in the plaintiff's complaint,"18 and the amount awarded as a per-
centage of the amount sought in the plaintiff's complaint, 129 the author
of the study gave a statistical analysis of the data to determine if the
disparities revealed by some of the data resulted from the change in jury
size or purely by chance."10  Some of the findings made, after incorporat-
ing the null hypothesis x"' into the evidence from the data included: there
is no statistical significant difference between the six-member jury and
the twelve-member jury as far as damage awards are concerned; 132 six-
member juries award the same proportion of damages sought in the com-
plaint as the twelve-member juries; 13  and there was no statistically sig-
nificant difference between the proportion of the plaintiffs verdicts ren-
dered by the two different-sized juries." 4  The author interpreted the
awarding the plaintiff some net amount and all cases not classified as plaintiff's
verdict were considered defendant's verdicts.
128. Id. at 689-93. The amount sought in the complaint, theoretically is the
estimate made by the plaintiff's attorney of the potential value of the plaintiff's cause
of action if the case were to go to trial. From the data collected, the median
amount sought in the six-member jury cases was higher in each category than the
median sought in twelve-member jury cases.
129. Id. at 690-97.
130. Id. at 698-700. This study used significance tests, namely, five null hypo-
theses (hypotheses that state no change occurred), which were simply an elabora-
tion of the United States Supreme Court's statement that there should not be any
discernible difference between the results produced by the different-sized juries. The
five hypotheses were:
1. The proportion of cases settled after trial has begun is the same in trials
before a six-member jury and in trials before a twelve-member jury.
2. The six-member jury has the same proportion of cases ending in hung
juries as the twelve-member jury.
3. The six-member jury renders verdicts in favor of plaintiffs and defend-
ants in the same proportion as the twelve-member jury renders its verdicts.
4. In rendering a money judgment for the plaintiff, the six-member jury's
damage awards are identical to the twelve-member jury's awards.
5. In rendering a money judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the six-mem-
ber jury awards the same proportion of the damages sought in the com-
plaint as the twelve-member jury awards.
Id. at 698-99.
In testing each null hypothesis, the sample statistic most relevant to the hypothe-
sis was chosen. Then, if the hypothesis was assumed true, the probability that the
observed value of the sample statistic would occur by chance was calculated. If
the calculated probability was greater than the standard .05 critical probability, the
likelihood of chance occurrence was great enough that the null hypothesis was not
rejected. If less than .05, sufficient doubt is cast on the hypothesis such that it
is rejected in favor of an alternative.
131. Supra note 130.
132. Id. at 704. Yet, in automobile negligence cases, there was difference be-
tween the awards of the two different-sized juries.
133. Id. at 705.
134. Id. at 703-04.
statistical evidence to mean that there are "no statistically significant dif-
ferences between six-member and twelve-member jury verdicts in civil
cases in Wayne County Circuit Court.'1 3 5
In examining whether the deliberative processes by which the above
results were achieved differ between the different-sized panels, social sci-
ence techniques were employed in testing a legal proposition. After set-
ting forth the hypotheses 136 and methodology utilized by the experi-
ment,' 37 the study presented the results obtained by examining the de-
liberations of different-sized juries concerning the same civil litigation. Af-
ter the two different-sized groups were statistically compared, the study
found there were no significant differences between the verdicts,' 3 num-
ber of issues discussed in the two different-sized panels, 3 9 and the six-
135. Id. at 710.
136. Comment, An Empirical Study of Six and Twelve-Member Jury Decision-
Making Processes, supra note 121, at 714-19. There were five hypotheses advanced
by the author. They were:
1. There will be no significant difference between the verdicts of six-mem-
ber juries and the verdicts of twelve-member juries.
2. There will be no significant differences in the deliberation times of six-
and twelve-member juries deliberating in the same case.
3. There will be a significantly greater number of individual contribu-
tions in the six-member jury than in the twelve-member jury.
4. There will be no significant difference between the number of issues
discussed by six-member juries and that discussed by twelve-member juries.
5. There will be greater juror satisfaction among the members of the six-
member jury than among members of the twelve-member jury.
Id. at 716-19.
137. Id. at 719-22. The study consisted of presenting a video taped trial, involv-
ing an actual automobile negligence case settled out of court, to eight six-member
juries and eight twelve-member juries. The actual plaintiff and defendant involved in
this accident portrayed themselves and an experienced trial attorney served as judge
with two third-year law students acting as the attorneys.
The trial lasted for two and one-half hours on the video tape machine and, ac-
cording to a questionnaire prepared by the researcher and administered to non-juror
viewers of the mock trial, the trial was found to be perceived as realistic.
The individuals participating in the experiment were 144 student jurors, randomly
selected from University of Michigan undergraduate speech classes. They viewed
the video tape of the trial between April and October of 1972 in either six-
member or twelve-member groups. After viewing the trial, these individuals an-
swered a preliminary questionnaire ascertaining their immediate individual verdict.
After the group decision, a second individual questionnaire was presented to arrive
at a comparison between pre- and post-deliberation opinions. The latter question-
naire also evaluated the juror's individual satisfaction with the deliberations. The
entire deliberation of each panel was coded so as to devise the number of issues
discussed and the pertinence of those issues to the deliberation.
138. Id. at 722-24.
139. Id. at 725-28. The author used a content analysis in this area, whereby
three coders listened to recordings of the entire respective deliberations. As a result
of this, a list was compiled of all issues discussed in all of the deliberations. The
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member jurors were not significantly more satisfied with the deliberative
process than were the twelve-member jurors. 140  Therefore, although the
results tend to establish that there is no discernible difference between
six-member and twelve-member juries, the empirical studies that have
been made in this area are somewhat confined and non-conclusive.
What the Court, in Colgrove, was doing by utilizing the conclusion in
Williams, was relying on an empirical assumption without any empirical
foundation. The majority of the Court found six-man juries to "repre-
sent a proper balance between competing demands of expedition and
group representation.' 14' Yet, as mentioned by Justice Marshall, in his
dissent, the Court found that a panel of six constitutes a "jury" within
the context of the seventh amendment without first defining what a "jury"
meant in terms of some arbitrary standard. 142  The Court did not pro-
vide an avenue, by reference to an abstract principle, to determine whether
"six is 'enough,' or five is 'too small,' and 20 'too large.' "143 Rather,
the Court merely incorporated the Williams conclusion that ",[W]hat is
required for a jury is a number large enough to facilitate group delibera-
tion combined with a likelihood of obtaining a representative cross sec-
tion of the community. ' 144 Thus, the test adopted by the Court is really
no test at all. As the dissent relates, it may be that the ideal jury would
provide "enough" group deliberation and community representation. Still,
the problem would arise as to how much is "enough." The Court also
added insult to injury when it left open the question of whether any num-
ber less than six would satisfy the seventh amendment's guarantee of trial
by jury in civil cases.' 45 Yet as Justice Marshall related, when "the
dockets become more crowded and pressures on jury trials grow, who
is to say that some future Court will not find three, or two, or one a
number large enough to satisfy"'146 the seventh amendment? Moreover,
what effect will the Colgrove decision have regarding the constitutionality
of six-member juries if a comprehensive study on federal civil courts is
made five years from now showing there is a discernible difference be-
tween the two-different sized panels? Therefore, the Court should have
content analysis of each deliberation resulted in no statistically significant difference
between the number of relevant and irrelevant issues discussed by the different-sized
juries.
140. Id. at 732-34.
141. 413 U.S. at 181 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. id. at 180.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 160 n.16.
145. Id. at 159-60.
146. ld. at 181.
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made their evaluations in terms of a hypothetical ideal jury of some arbi-
trarily chosen size.147 Hence, due to the empirical inadequacies pre-
sented both in Williams and current studies, as well as the lack of arbi-
trary definition, as to what is a "jury," the Court in Colgrove was too
premature in deciding that a jury of six satisfies the seventh amendment
guarantee of "trial by jury."
CONCLUSION
It was not the purpose of this casenote to declare the Court's decision
in Colgrove incorrect with regard to the consitutionality of the local rule
insofar as the seventh amendment is concerned. Rather, this casenote
was intended to show that not only was complete discussion of the real
rationale not provided by the Court as to why the framers did not intend-
and the common law right of trial by jury did not require-twelve-mem-
ber panels, but also that the constitutionality of six-member juries was
merely assumed with a definite standard as to what constitutes a "jury"
as well as lack of any empirical verification. The jury system does serve
an important function in our system of government. It provides a liaison
between the judiciary and the citizenry in transmitting the legal philoso-
phy of the former to the latter, imbuing "all classes with a respect for
the thing judged and with the notion of right.' 148  Yet, neither in the
framers' intention nor the common law right of trial by jury is there sup-
port for the contention that a "jury" should always be composed of twelve
individuals. Although the seventh amendment did incorporate existing
common law features of the jury system, the twice mentioned usage of
the term "common law" contained in the amendment had nothing what-
soever to do with the number of people that must constitute a jury.
Juries consisting of less than twelve persons are not a current development
in the United States. They were utilized in colonial America. Even
though numerous federal district courts have passed rules providing for
six-member civil juries,'1 49 conclusive "empirical" statistics showing there
is no discernible difference between twelve and six-member panels are
lacking. Therefore, Colgrove evinces a lack of consideration of these
facts in upholding six-man juries based on the rationale stated in
the Court's opinion.
Joel Handler
147. It is important to note that Justice Marshall, in his dissent, contended that
the inevitable process of arbitrary line drawing belongs to the legislative branch
which is far better equipped to make ad hoe compromises. Id. at 182-83.
148. 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 295 (Vintage Books ed. 1957).
149. Supra note 96.
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